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THE ISCIP ANALYST 
Volume 2, Number 12 (July 12, 1997) 
 
Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
PRESIDENCY 
Yel'tsin finally confirms daughter's status 
On June 30, President Yel'tsin appointed his daughter, Tatiana Dyachenko, as 
presidential adviser and image maker. Acknowledging her role on last year's 
campaign staff and her continuing advisory role, Dyachenko remarked that the 
appointment gave her an official status and "put an end to certain awkwardness." 
(ITAR-TASS, 30 Jun 1997) 
 
Dyachenko's position in the president's entourage has received a great deal of 
attention in the press over the past year. Her critical-moment intervention 
following the arrest of campaign staffers Yevstafyev and Lisovsky (see previous 
digests) led to Yel'tsin's decision to fire Kremlin hardliners Barsukov and 
Korzhakov. Her constant presence near the president (she has even begun 
accompanying him on foreign trips) reinforces her image as a filter of information 
and contacts for Yel'tsin. With this appointment, Dyachenko becomes part of the 
presidential administration and "structurally" answerable to Chief of Staff Valentin 
Yumashev. 
 
Yel'tsin election anniversary address  
Calling the year since his election as president of the Russian Federation the 
"most difficult year of his life," Yel'tsin noted the hardships facing the country, but 
promised that prosperity is "just around the corner." (RIA-Novosti, 3 Jul 97) In 
this election anniversary radio address, Yel'tsin also claimed that production 
would increase in the coming year and promised to focus on the public health 
system and military reform. 
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In what may be a signal that he has reached a decision not to dissolve the Duma, 
despite persistent rumors, Yel'tsin claimed "I've also started trying more 
insistently to come to terms with the State Duma, which had provoked the 
President for a long time. Previously, I would have exploded and dealt a 
smashing punch. But, right now, I've launched a calm discussion with the Duma 
in a bid to find a way out of the situation." While many still believe a confrontation 
with the Duma is likely, it is possible that negotiations, most likely between 
Chernomyrdin's NDR and Zyuganov's Communist Party, will forestall a 
dissolution of the current Duma. 
 
A friendship revived?  
Moskovsky komsomolets (5 Jun 97) is reporting that President Yel'tsin recently 
dined with old friend and former FSB head Barsukov and thanked him for 
foregoing the noisy Korzhakov route of disgruntled employees. Barsukov has 
avoided comment on his dismissal or any Kompromat he may have on leading 
political figures apparently in the hopes of returning to Kremlin service. While this 
may appear overly optimistic with the Chubais faction so clearly ascendant, 
Barsukov would certainly be aware of the president's inclination to surround 
himself with a balance of viewpoints, especially in the form of good friends. 
 
New book from former guard  
Former Korzhakov deputy in the Presidential Security Services, Col. Valeri 
Streletsky, has published a memoir. In addition to discussing corruption in the 
Kremlin, Streletsky revisits the Lisovsky-Yevstafyev arrests. Excerpts recently 
appeared in Pravda-5. For a discussion of his earlier comments about the affair, 
see previous digests. 
 
GOVERNMENT 
Kovalev out, Stepashin back in the spotlight  
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Justice Minister Valentin Kovalev, pressured out of office following the publication 
of a steamy sauna video purportedly of him and some female companions, has 
been replaced by the irrepressible Sergei Stepashin. (Segodnya, 3 Jul 97) 
Stepashin was Barsukov's predecessor as head of the Federal Security Services 
(at the time the FCS). He was forced out in the aftermath of the Chechen raid on 
Budennovsk. Most recently, Stepashin has been chief of the Administrative 
Department of the Government Staff, where he coordinated the activities of the 
power organs. He was also an instrumental member of the commission 
negotiating the Chechen settlement. 
 
SECURITY SERVICES 
Prosecutor seeks supervision of wiretapping 
General Prosecutor Yuri Skuratov, acting on instructions from President Yel'tsin, 
recently announced a new effort to "step up supervision over the observance of 
legality in the sphere of telephone tapping in the country." (Novaya gazeta, 9-15 
Jun 97) Skuratov is seeking new legislation to strengthen the role of the 
prosecutor's office in fulfilling its supervisory role in investigations. 
 
As a reminder of the extent of wiretapping authority among Russia's security 
organs, the Law on Operational-Investigative Activity provides the following 
agencies with rights to conduct phone surveillance: MVD; FSB; tax police; Main 
Protection Directorate and Presidential Security Services [recently merged and 
renamed the Federal Protection Service (FSO)]; border guards; customs organs; 
and the Foreign Intelligence Service. Skuratov also listed the Main Intelligence 
Directorate of the General Staff. One more service comes to mind: FAPSI, 
although rumors persist as to its planned envelopment in the FSB. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Chandler Rosenberger 
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Yel'tsin addresses G-7 in Denver, but will not attend NATO's July meeting  
At its late-June summit in Denver, the G-7 admitted Russia to the "Paris Club," a 
collection of industrialized, creditor nations. Russia's admittance will allow it more 
easily to collect and forgive international loans first extended by the former Soviet 
Union, particularly loans to African states. (Rossiyskiye vesti, 24 Jun 97). 
 
Speaking at the opening of the G-7's Denver meeting on 20 June, Russian 
President Boris Yel'tsin described the political situation at home as "stable" and 
the economic prospects as "promising." He praised the Founding Act on NATO-
Russia relations, signed last month in Paris, and called for a European Security 
Charter and speedy revision of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. 
(ITAR-TASS World Service, 21 Jun 97) 
 
Yel'tsin turned down an invitation, however, to attend the July 9-10 meeting of 
NATO, to be held in Madrid, due to his continued opposition to NATO expansion. 
The sixteen member states of NATO are expected to approve the admittance of 
Central European states to the alliance by 1999. Deputy Prime Minister Valeriy 
Serov, whose specialty is Russia's relations with the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, will instead lead the delegation. (Interfax, 26 Jun 97) 
 
French diplomat warns NATO-Russia accord will confuse decision-making 
The envisioned "permanent joint council" to be established between NATO and 
Russia will likely render decision-making within the alliance "unclear," a former 
representative of France to the Atlantic Council has predicted. 
 
Writing in Paris' Les Echos, Francois Rose warned that the definition of "joint 
decision-making" included in the Founding Act on NATO-Russian relations is too 
vague. The Founding Act states that the permanent joint council will "be the main 
forum for consultation between NATO and Russia in the event of a crisis and in 
any other situation jeopardizing peace and security." 
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"There is every reason to suspect, therefore, that under these circumstances the 
NATO-Russia Council could become a kind of appeal body appended to the 
Atlantic Council," Rose wrote. (Les Echos, 26 Jun 97) 
 
Nemtsov secures deals in Tokyo and Beijing, rebuffs EU representative  
First Vice Premier Boris Nemtsov, Russia's rising political star, secured trade 
deals with Japan and China on a Far East tour that he undertook after rebuffing 
the European Union. 
 
In Japan, Nemtsov secured agreements on Russian debt and $400 million in 
investment, for which he pledged to "personal support" for the first three private 
investors from Japan to pass the $100-million mark. (Trud, 14 Jun 97) At least 
one Japanese analyst has concluded that Russia and Japan will henceforth be 
tied by personal relations rather than "rigid bureaucrat-led interaction." (Mainichi 
Shimbun, 21 Jun 97). 
 
In Beijing a week later, Nemtsov attended a meeting of the Russian-Chinese 
Inter-governmental Commission, at which the two nations agreed to build a gas 
pipeline from Irkutsk to South Korea. The pipeline will cross Mongolia and China. 
(Interfax, 24 Jun 97). 
 
Before leaving for the Far East, Nemtsov refused to meet European Commission 
Vice President Sir Leon Brittan, in protest of anti-dumping restrictions that the EU 
had placed on Russian raw materials. (Delovoy mir, 19 Jun 97) 
 
Comment 
Is Nemtsov Primakov's man?  
Whether analyzing the imminent return of Hong Kong to Chinese rule, or 
attempting to pick sides within the post-Communist states of Eastern Europe, the 
West has a bad habit of finding political virtue in politicians whose primary 
interest is economic reform. The enthusiasm with which Western capitals greeted 
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the promotion of Boris Nemtsov must now be tempered by concern. Nemtsov's 
recent actions may indicate that the young reformer is a vigorous proponent of 
economic reform because he seeks a nation strong enough to assert itself on the 
international stage. 
 
Nemtsov's tour of the Far East was, at the very least, scripted by Foreign Minister 
Yevgeni Primakov, not known as a man endeared of Western foreign policy. 
Nemtsov's emphasis on bilateral deals with both China and Japan certainly fits 
Primakov's goal of a "strategic partnership" with both nations. Nemtsov's curt 
dismissal of Sir Leon Brittan over anti-dumping regulations also reveals a streak 
of petulance that would promote Primakov's larger agenda. 
 
It is still too early to dismiss Nemtsov. One only hopes that it is not too late for 
Western nations to learn not to embrace every free-market economist in power. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Political Parties and Legislative 
Branch 
By Michael Thurman 
 
FEDERAL ASSEMBLY 
Duma condemns Turkish genocide of Kurds 
Chairman of the State Duma Committee for Geopolitics Aleksei Mitrofanov said 
Turkey resorted to the use of power to establish control over the region through 
creating a pro-Turkish regime, which means gross interference into internal 
affairs of a neighbour state. The Geopolitics Committee believes the Turkish 
army should be immediately pulled out from the Kurdish autonomous district of 
Iraq. Mitrofanov urges the Council of Europe and other international 
organizations to put a stop to Turkish aggression in Northern Iraq. 
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It is comforting to see Russian concern for human rights abroad, but this 
pronouncement is more in keeping with what could be considered Russia's 
paranoid fear of Turkey, than with some newly emergent international altruism. 
Plus, it is unclear how annoying a member of NATO is going to benefit the 
Russia-NATO agreement. (ITAR-TASS, 19 May 97) 
 
The Democratic Union of Russia (DUR) tells UK to keep Hong Kong 
Perhaps benefiting from personal experience, the DUR told Queen Elizabeth, 
among other British officials, that Communists cannot be trusted. "No 
international treaties with China justify the betrayal which is to happen in a 
month...." The central coordinating council of the Democratic Union is asking 
Great Britain to send its troops into Hong Kong, and to add to them, if necessary, 
NATO troops, and to hold a referendum on independence. (Informatsionnoye 
agentstvo ekho moskvy, 24 May 97) 
 
New center-right political coalition emerges 
The coalition, tentatively called the Union of Progressive Russian Forces, is 
described as being "center-right." The agreements were signed on 6 June 1997. 
The coalition will include Our Home is Russia, chaired by Prime Minister Victor 
Chernomyrdin; Reforms - New Course, lead by Vladimir Shumeiko; and People's 
Homes, headed by Sergei Filatov. 
 
This is yet another attempt to fashion, or refashion, the political party structure in 
the Russian Federation with an eye toward the construction of a two- or three-
party system. But as long as parties are based on personalities rather than ideas, 
coalitions will inevitably be temporary. (Interfax in English, 1300 GMT, 27 May 
1997; wnc.fedworld.gov) 
 
REGIONAL ELECTIONS 
Magadan region electoral results 
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Lawyer Vladimir Butkeev was elected to the Russian State Duma in Magadan 
region. The turnout for the State Duma and local elections was 43.79%. This 
makes the elections valid under regional law. Nikolai Karpenko has been 
reelected Magadan mayor (Interfax, 19 May 97). 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By CDR John Steele 
 
Moscow bargains with missile sales as lever 
Moscow has agreed to forego the sale of S-300 PMU1 anti-aircraft missiles to 
Cyprus if the island is declared a "demilitarized zone" -- a sure non-starter from 
the Turkish perspective. (Monitor, 17 Jun 97) 
 
Comment 
The Russians appear to be attempting to leverage arms sales into increasingly 
close Greek relations, which in turn drives a wedge in NATO. There is a lot going 
on here, not just relative to the Aegean, and arguably none of it good for regional 
stability or long-term peace. 
 
Encroachments seen 
Russian border guards fired on Japanese fishermen near the Kuril Islands; two 
Japanese were injured. (RFE/RL Newsline, 26 Jun 97) 
 
Comment 
Both countries claim the Kurils, and the Russians, defensive and preoccupied 
with loss of empire, are not disposed to accept any perceived encroachment -- 
this isn't the first time this has occurred and look for more of these types of 
incidents. 
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A similarly perceived encroachment resulted in the Russians protesting the use 
of a specially configured U.S. P-3 aircraft performing geographic survey work in 
Kazakhstan. The Russians claim the plane is spying on Russia and former Soviet 
test ranges in Kazakhstan. (Reuters, 26 Jun 97). 
 
Duma cites need for more money to destroy weapons 
Russia says it needs $5 billion to destroy chemical weapons. (Reuters, 20 Jun 
97) 
 
Comment 
Russia's Duma has failed to ratify the chemical weapons convention, citing the 
need for additional foreign funding and an extension on the destruction time limit. 
Russia is having no trouble funneling money into R&D and high priority strategic 
systems. The U.S. and Germany have already provided funds for chemical 
weapon destruction, but the Russians clearly think there may be more where that 
came from -- the technical term is extortion. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Chechnya 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
Aliev receives Maskhadov 
Maskhadov met a far warmer reception in Baku than in the Baltic capitals he 
visited a week earlier. The 1 July interview with the Azeri president was 
Maskhadov's first reception by a head of a foreign state. The two discussed 
"broad political questions" and issues pertaining to the transport of Azeri oil to 
Novorossiisk. (Reuters, 1 Jul 97) 
 
Customs and banking deals may expedite agreement on oil 
Since January Chechnya sought a voice equal to Azerbaijan and Russia in the 
negotiations regarding the transport of oil across its territory, which Russia and 
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Azerbaijan have conceded during June. Chechnya has held out for favorable 
terms in the banking and customs agreements and Maskhadov has insisted that 
they precede the oil agreement. Chechnya's tactic has proven largely successful, 
because Moscow can ill afford to further delay the operation of the Novorossiisk 
line. 
 
The banking agreement, which was concluded by the Russian Central Bank and 
the National Bank of Chechnya in May, was not approved by the Russian 
government until Chernomyrdin signed it on 9 July. The July text has not been 
made public but the head of Russia's Central Bank, Sergei Dubinin, described its 
basic provisions. The National Bank of Chechnya will open a correspondent 
account in the Russian Central Bank through which all the financial settlements 
between Chechnya and Moscow will be conducted. The Chechen bank will 
regulate banking in Chechnya and will not be part of the Central Bank of the 
Russian Federation. The ruble will remain Chechnya's currency. The Chechen 
banks will not be authorized to have foreign currency accounts in Moscow banks, 
but may set up such accounts in foreign countries. The agreement will be in 
effect one year. (Interfaks-Aif, 19-25 May 97) 
 
The early oil from the Azeri fields is supposed to begin flowing along the Russian 
route by the end of this year. The failure to resolve peripheral issues, such as the 
status of Djokar-gala's Sheik Mansour airport, have held up the customs 
agreement and the oil agreement and pushed forward the date when repairs and 
operations of the pipeline can begin. Transneft, the Russian pipeline monopoly, 
estimates that it will need $2 million and 20 days to repair the Chechen portion of 
the pipeline. Transneft, which is obligated by an agreement with Azerbaijan to 
ensure the safe passage of oil, also seeks a separate agreement with 
Chechnya's Southern Oil Company (Yunko). (Reuters, 1 Jul 97) 
 
Yunko president declares Chechnya environmental disaster zone 
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Khozh-Akhmed Yarikhanov, Yunko president, has called on international 
environmental and relief organizations as well as oil companies that have 
experience in clean-up activities to aid Djokar-gala. Tens of thousands tons of oil 
products form underground lakes under the Chechen capital and surrounding 
regions. These shallow deposits, that in some cases rise to the surface, can 
catch fire or explode. The vapors may also cause mass poisoning. Many 
Chechens rely on the wells they dig for their own fuel needs and for cash income. 
But this dangerous practice has led to increasing numbers of deaths from 
poisoning, fire, and explosion. (Interfax, 14 Jun 97) 
 
Poll shows most Russians think Chechnya will be independent  
Of 1,600 Russians polled on June 7 and 8 by the All-Russian Center for Public 
Opinion Studies (VTsIOM), 74% approve of the recent peace treaty with 
Chechnya, 12% disapprove and 14% are undecided. In response to another 
question, 52% thought that Chechnya would eventually become an independent 
state, 25% said it would remain in Russia and 23% did not know. (Interfax, 19 
Jun 97) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: CIS 
By Mark Jones 
 
Ruble may be made reserve currency of CIS nations 
Noting that since detailed talks on the subject are already underway, 
representatives of the Bank of Russia proposed to make the ruble the reserve 
currency of the entire CIS. The same representatives claimed that proposals to 
this effect have been recently forwarded to most of the national banks of 
Commonwealth countries (ITAR-TASS, 9 Jun 97). First Deputy Prime Minister 
and Finance Minister Anatoli Chubais commented while in Denver that although 
Russia is not imposing the idea on anyone, the ruble is the leading non-national 
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currency in most CIS countries and will most likely evolve into the CIS reserve 
currency. (Interfax, 22 Jun 97) 
 
Presidents sign accords 
The presidents of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan held a summit where they signed 
15 bilateral agreements. The more notable accords focused on development and 
cooperation in the areas of transportation, the oil and gas industries, sea 
navigation, and customs affairs. In a press conference after the signing, the 
presidents discussed the possibility of constructing a pipeline linking the two 
countries. The pipeline would be built under and stretch the entire length of the 
Caspian Sea, allowing Kazakhstan a non-Russian controlled route to export its 
oil and gas (ITAR-TASS, 10 Jun 97). Such cordial relations between the two 
countries point to the ever-deepening ties between the Central Asian and 
Caucasus states and may signal the rise of yet another power center within the 
CIS. 
 
Evolution of the border troops 
The director of the Russian Federation Border Service, Andrei Nikolaev, has 
announced that his organization is evolving from a mere guard force to "a single 
master on the border." According to Nikolaev, the Border Troops have changed 
their name to the Border Guards Service and will be expanding their scope of 
duties. Soon, and with the blessing of President Yeltsin, a border guard will be "a 
single representative of the state who carries out all the necessary formalities for 
leaving or entering the state." These formalities will include matters of 
"international law, intelligence, counter-intelligence, military security itself, border 
checking procedures" and eventually customs and immigration controls. Nikolaev 
also noted that no border guards will be stationed on the Russian-Kazakh border, 
but that Russians will still stand on the CIS "outer borders" to show the 
"existence of our strategic interest on these [outer] borders" (Radio Moscow, 11 
Jun 97). 
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In another interview, Nikolaev claimed that Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and 
Tajikistan "delegated to [the] Russian Federation's border troops the prerogative 
of guarding their state borders..." (Panorama, 6 Jun 97). We can see that senior 
Russian officials have not lost their ability to spin revisionist yarns. 
 
What does this evolution mean? The implications are best summed up in an 
article in Rossiyskiye vesti (19 Jun 97). According to the paper, "while politicians 
look for ways of rapprochment between the states of the commonwealth, the 
border guards, as we can see, have engaged in earnest in this task." The Border 
Service, so expertly exploited in the past to maintain Russian dominance in the 
NIS, will now be in an even better position to continue doing so in the future. It 
may yet prove the instrument of choice to "reintegrate" the union. 
 
CIS committee meets in Minsk 
The CIS Joint Consultative Commission on Disarmament met for two days to 
discuss how "to adapt the [CFE treaty] to present day conditions." By the end of 
the meeting, the commission supported the establishment of a nuclear free zone 
in Central Europe and also favored banning the use antipersonnel mines. Details 
on what will be done with respect to CFE were not forthcoming. (ITAR-TASS, 17 
and 19 Jun 97) 
 
The hazards of peacekeeping duty, part 2 
Another Russian has been killed while on peacekeeping duty. A Russian major 
was shot to death and a warrant officer was severely wounded in Dushanbe. This 
killing, on the heels of similar incidents in Georgia at the beginning of the month, 
brings to 24 the number of Russian "peacekeepers" killed in June. (Interfax, 17 
Jun 97) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
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TAJIKISTAN 
Operation to arrest President Rahmonov's attackers turns violent 
On 4 May 1997, a special rapid reaction force consisting of members of 
Tajikistan's Security Ministry, Interior Ministry, and the Prosecutor's Office 
launched an operation to arrest the members of a criminal gang who were 
accused of masterminding the 30 April assassination attempt on President 
Rahmonov. The gang contained at least 10 members, including Firdaws 
Dustboboev (he was arrested on 30 April in connection with the assassination 
attempt) and was led by Khurshed Abduhafizovich Abdushukurov. Government 
investigators also charged the group with planning "terrorist attacks" on regional 
Leninobod authorities and justified the rapid reaction force's actions by stating 
that in order to prevent further attacks of this nature, the group had to be 
immediately neutralized. Most of the group's members were hiding in the village 
of Qistakuz (15 km southeast of Khojand, in Leninobod Oblast') when the rapid 
reaction force was sent in to arrest them. Government officials stated that the 
group's members were given a chance to surrender peacefully, but chose to use 
armed resistance instead. As many as five members of Abdushukurov's group 
may have been killed during the shoot-out (Radio Tajikistan Network, 5 May 97). 
Two of the men allegedly committed suicide, including Abdushukurov himself. 
(ITAR-TASS World Service, 4 May 97) 
 
Comment 
It is interesting to note that Tajik government officials have made no statements 
about possible motives for the Abdushukurov group's alleged crimes. 
Immediately following the attempt on President Rahmonov's life, theories as to 
who was responsible for the attack and the reasons behind it were abundant. 
One of the theories most popular in Tajik government circles seemed to be that it 
was Abdumalik Abdullojonov's National Revival Bloc (which has a great deal of 
support in Khojand and which has been denied a voice in the transitional 
government) and/or disenfranchised Khojandi political factions which carried out 
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the attempt on the president's life in an effort to destabilize the current Tajik 
government and derail the inter-Tajik peace process. The mayor of Dushanbe, 
Mahmadsaid Ubaidulloev, openly accused Abdullojonov of perpetrating the 
attack and Deputy Prime Minister Abdurahmon Azimov stated that the goal of 
those responsible for the assassination attempt was to throw Tajikistan into a 
state of complete political instability (ITAR-TASS World Service, 1 May 97). 
Abdushukurov's group, however, has thus far been dismissed as a criminal gang 
or as a "group of robbers" (Radio Tajikistan Network, 5 May 97) and no reasons 
have been offered for why they might have been planning additional attacks on 
regional officials. Firdaws Dustboboev, one of the men who was arrested on 30 
April in connection with the assassination attempt and an alleged member of 
Abdushukurov's group, was also one of the organizers of anti-government rallies 
held in Khojand in the spring of 1996. One possible conclusion then, is that 
whether Abdushukurov's group was responsible for the assassination attempt, 
the Tajik government wanted to halt its anti-government activities, as part of what 
seems to have become a general crackdown on political opposition in Leninobod 
Oblast', whether that opposition emanates from National Revival Bloc 
sympathizers or from UTO supporters. 
 
Final round of inter-Tajik peace negotiations successfully concluded  
Despite a number of misgivings voiced by UTO leaders Said Abdullo Nuri and 
Haji Akbar Turajonzoda about the sincerity of the Tajik government's commitment 
to the peace process, the final round of the inter-Tajik peace negotiations came 
to a successful conclusion in Tehran on 28 May, with the signing of a protocol 
detailing the steps of the peace process. The protocol established that the 
National Reconciliation Commission would be led by a UTO representative and 
allocated 30% of the positions in the government's executive power structures, 
as well as 25% of the seats on the Central Election Commission to the UTO. The 
protocol provides for the legalization of all political opposition parties and 
movements, as long as their activities do not contradict the Tajik constitution or 
existing laws. The governments of Russia, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, 
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Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan are to act as guarantors 
of the implementation of the measures set out by all of the peace agreements 
(Interfax, 28 May 97). The ambassadors of these countries are to form a contact 
group which will be stationed in Dushanbe in order to monitor the carrying out of 
the peace agreements and to provide any consultations or good offices which 
either the UTO or the Tajik government might require (Xinhua, 28 May 97). CIS 
peace keepers already stationed in Tajikistan are to be responsible for 
overseeing the return of UTO forces from Afghanistan to Tajikistan, although the 
UN mission is charged with overseeing the whole operation. As soon as this 
general agreement has been signed, the National Reconciliation Commission will 
be able to begin its tasks (Interfax, 28 May 97). [Although scheduled to be signed 
in mid-June, the general agreement was not signed until the end of the month in 
Moscow (ITAR-TASS, 27 Jun 97).] 
 
It was also agreed that before the National Reconciliation Commission begins 
functioning, 460 UTO troops will be stationed in Dushanbe in order to guarantee 
the commission's security, and each side's representatives on the commission 
are permitted to have an additional 40 bodyguards for their personal security 
(Clandestine Voice of Free Tajikistan, 30 May 97). 
 
Comment 
One of the UTO leaders' main reasons for doubting the strength of the Tajik 
government's commitment to the peace process is the recent arrest of a number 
of opposition supporters. It was the arrest of 10-15 opposition members which 
caused the April peace negotiations to break down, and since the assassination 
attempt on President Rahmonov, the arrests have continued, especially in 
Leninobod Oblast', where both UTO supporters and people affiliated with the 
National Revival Bloc seem to be targeted. In fact, the Tajik government seems 
to have seized upon the assassination attempt as an excuse to crack down on 
the disenfranchised Khojandi faction (which has been excluded from power since 
1993) at least some of whose members now appear to support the National 
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Revival Bloc. Abdumalik Abdullojonov's younger brother was detained by the 
police on 23 May. On 25 May Said Abdullo Nuri sent a statement to Interfax from 
Tehran, in which he condemned the Tajik government's persecution of the UTO 
and other regional political opposition groups and called for an end to the arrests 
and reprisals, on the grounds that these actions constituted a threat to the peace 
process. He also stated that the UTO does not want its truce with the Tajik 
government to be used against any other political opposition movement (Interfax, 
26 May 97). Nuri, at least, seems to have recognized that only a government 
which includes representatives of all the major opposition groups and regional 
power blocs can succeed in rebuilding Tajikistan. 
 
Officials deny former Afghan president's presence in Tajikistan 
According to a source in the Afghan embassy, former President Burhanuddin 
Rabbani (he is allied with General Ahmad Shah Mas'ud) arrived in the southern 
Tajik town of Kulab either on 25 or 26 May, ostensibly to seek refuge from the 
Taleban, who it was feared would soon control all of northern Afghanistan (ITAR-
TASS World Service, 26 May 97). Rabbani left Kulab for Iran on 26 May, 
according to an anonymous member of the Russian border guards stationed in 
Tajikistan (Informatsionnoye agentstvo ekho moskvy, 26 May 97). A spokesman 
for President Rahmonov vehemently denied that President Rabbani had ever 
been on Tajik territory, but a source close to President Rahmonov stated that the 
Tajik government had provided Rabbani with an air corridor to fly to Iran (Interfax, 
27 May 97). 
 
Six more of Sodirov's supporters arrested in Dushanbe  
The Tajik Presidential Guard arrested another six of Rezvon Sodirov's field 
commanders in Dushanbe on 11 May, according to Tajik military sources. 
Rezvon Sodirov himself was still suspected to be hiding in a mountain gorge with 
a few of his supporters, and authorities continued to look for members of his 
militia group in Dushanbe (ITAR-TASS) 
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